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Variety and complexity of religious




Hundred years after William James' famous book, the question of the
variety of religious orientations deserves new reflection. The rapid
changes in the religious landscape in our Western societies require a
methodological response in psychology of religion research. A
challenging example is the new type of religious socialization which I
have called 'accumulative heretic' and for which some research results
report a generational accumulation. We expect results from research
on new religious fundamentalist deconverts to speak to this question
also. Has religion become a question of style, of life-style? It appears
that our perspectives for understanding and our instruments in
empirical research need an adjustment. Based upon James Fowler's
faith development theory, but with reference to recent proposals in
structural-developmental and life-span developmental psychology, I
propose a model of religious styles which, in the first place, is the
attempt to better account for the complexity of religious development,
including its psychodynamic, interpersonal, life-history and life-world
related dimensions. In this way, not only research in faith development
could venture more out of its niche and contribute its gift for
investigating the variety of religious orientations in religious
communities and milieus, but more specifically, new developments in
the religious landscape can be taken into account.
Hundred years after William James’ famous text, the question of the variety of
religious orientations deserves new reflection. The religious landscape has
changed significantly. The growing acceptance for the model of the religious
seeker in the scientific study of religion
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(Pender, 2000), the felt necessity to account for ‘religion as quest’ (Batson,
Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993) and the recent focus on spirituality1 can be taken as
reflection of and response to the changes in the religious landscape in our
Western societies. A challenging example is the new type of religious-
biographical trajectory which I have called ‘accumulative heretic’2 and for which
some research results (Roof, 1993; 1999; Beaudoin, 1998) report a generational
accumulation, e.g. in Generation X. We expect results from research on new
religious fundamentalist deconverts to speak to this question also.
The changes in the religious landscape require not only new efforts in the
social scientific study of religion to account for the statistical extent and the life-
world relatedness of such increased variety of religious orientations;3 the new
situation also requires conceptual and methodological responses from the
psychology of religion. In regard to development, we previously already have
had reason to call into question any privilege of unilinear explanations such as
they are advocated by most of the Piagetian perspectives, because some doubt is
justified that they fully comprehend religious development – especially in
“irregular” developmental variants such as the vicious circle of adolescent
atheism (Döbert, 1991) and fundamentalist conversion in midlife (Streib, 2001a;
2001c). The increased new variety however reinforces the need to take account
of the variance of developmental trajectories in the terms of psychology.4
The variety of developmental trajectories, however, points to the greater
complexity of human and religious development. Complexity refers to an internal
variety of factors and dimensions which are involved in development. Models of
complexity have surpassed or extended the unidimensional, unidirectional, and
unifunctional accounts of development which have dominated the
                                                
1 There is a growing body of research results, especially in the USA, on spirituality (Zinnbauer
et al., 1997; Scott, 2001; Marler & Hadaway, 2002); for a recent overview see Marler &
Hadaway (2002) or Streib (2003d).
2 See my Research Report for the Enquete Commission of the 13th German Parliament (Streib,
1998).
3 Social scientific study of religion has e.g. to address the question of whether religion has
become a question of style, of life-style (Streib, 1997; 2003c).
4 Such variance is the theme of most of the chapters in Lerner's & Damon's (1998) volume. See
also Lachmann & James (1997).
125
Piagetian family of theories. This strong focus and the lack of serious
consideration of alternative factors, dimensions and perspectives can be traced
back to Jean Piaget’s own reluctance to seriously engage in a correlation of his
ideas and findings with the psychoanalytic view of Sigmund Freud5 or to take
notice of the phenomenological perspective on child development of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty.6 Half a century later, we realize with greater clarity the
consequences of this momentous neglect. In the decades to follow, we find
among Piagetians, especially in the Kohlberg school, energetic engagement in
defining the exclusive unidimensional and unidirectional structural-
developmental “logic”7 with its methodic obsession to separate structure from
any content.8 For instance, the acknowledgment of cross-domain asynchronity, of
décalage, of which we find indeed some notion in Piaget’s work had an almost
subversive tone and some colleagues felt the need here to defend Piaget against
the Piagetians.9 This speaks to our theme: it gives rise to some doubt that the
developmental and religious variety has a chance to find resonance in pure
Piagetian theories, if unchanged. Recent contributions therefore
                                                
5 We have at least a brief recognition of Freud’s work (Piaget, 1971); but this presentation
before the APA only envisions “a general theory of psychology that integrates the discoveries
of cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis;” for the time being, Piaget however denies that
“affectivity engenders or modifies cognitive structures” and he concludes that “affective and
cognitive mechanisms are inseparable, although distinct: the former depend on energy, and the
latter depend on structure” (71). For Piaget’s more systematic discussion of psychoanalysis,
see his Play, dreams, and imitation in childhood (Piaget, 1945).
6 Piaget did not respond in any way to Merleau-Ponty’s lectures at the Sorbonne on child
development (Merleau-Ponty, 1988). A reconstruction of the discourse between Piaget and
Merleau-Ponty which never took place has been presented by Liebsch (1992).
7 Criteria for “hard” developmental theories are: structural difference, irreversibility, structural
wholeness, hierarchical integration and universality (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1984).
8 The separation of structure from any content has been criticized heavily (Döbert, 1986).
9 The Piagetian and, even more, the neo-Piagetian understanding of décalage indicates an
awareness of non-synchronicity of cognitive development, but of course it explains only a
delay of an assumed developmental progression and neither Piaget, nor Piagetian scholars
have explicated a ‘theory of décalage’ (Cocking, 1979; Chapman, 1988; Bidell & Fisher,
1992: 110; 116; Case, 1992; Montada, 1998).
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maintain “that horizontal décalage is the rule in development rather than the
exception.”10
Fortunately, the field is broader and we may take a fresh approach to
understanding the variety and complexity of religious development. Including
and expanding on innovative proposals in developmental psychology such as
life-span development, wisdom research, narrative approaches, neo-Piagetian
and psychoanalytic perspectives may allow to sketch the outline of an emerging
model of development which is able to account for the variety and complexity of
religious development. I understand these innovative proposals as impulses for
modifying our understanding of human development and thus of religious
development. They would need to be discussed in more detail, but for reason of
time and space, I shall concentrate on the life-span model of Paul Baltes and
Ursula Staudinger first and foremost.11
Lifespan psychology and wisdom research – arguments to take a
broader focus in developmental psychology
According to Baltes, Staudinger and Lindenberger (1998), life-span
developmental psychology maintains “that ontogenesis extends across the entire
life course and that lifelong adaptive processes are involved” (Baltes et.al. 1998,
1029). This implies a reformulation of the traditional concept of development.
The authors maintain that lifespan psychology, in developing and refining a
multi-level framework, has “benefited much from transdisciplinary dialogue,
especially with modern developmental biologists but also with cultural
psychologists” (Baltes et.al. 1999, 499). To go into more detail: In their view of
human development, Baltes, Staudinger and
                                                
10 There is a growing awareness among neo-Piagetian developmentalists that horizontal
décalage is the rule rather than the exception (Canfield & Ceci, 1992: 289).
11 Also Richard M. Lerner, in his textbook on adolescence (Lerner, 2002: 51-53), has given
prominence to Baltes’ and Staudinger’s model. Lerner concludes that, besides
Bronfenbrenner’s ecological perspective, Baltes’ and Staudinger’s model is “most useful at
this point in the history of the study of adolescence,” because we need strong interaction
theories which are integrative, but account for the plasticity and diversity of development.
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Lindenberger focus not only on interindividual commonalities, but also on
interindividual differences, and on interindividual malleability (Baltes et.al.
1998, 1030; 1999, 472). The authors are aware of attempts of some lifespan
developmentalists, and here the authors refer explicitly to Labouvie-Vief (1992),
who “offer alternative conceptions of ontogenetic development that departed
from the notion of holistic and unidirectional growth, according to which all
aspects of the developing system were geared toward a higher level of
integration and functioning” (Baltes et.al. 1999, 479). Baltes and colleagues
however introduce a more radical departure from extant theoretical models of
development. Their proposal is an even more flexible construction of
development, namely a model of “development as selective age-related change in
adaptive capacity”. The authors introduce their functionalist developmental
model of adaptive capacity which, in contrast to the traditional monolithic view
of development as universal growth toward a single end point, accounts for
cross-domain differences; the “capacity to move between levels of knowledge
and skills” (Ibid., 480) is a necessary condition, when development is defined as
‘selective adaptation’.
Consequently, the new model accounts for losses, as well as for gains in
development. The economy of loss and gain has made its way even into the
fundamental definition of ‘development’: “Successful development is defined ...
as the conjoint maximization of gains (desirable goals or outcomes) and the
minimization of losses (undesirable goals or outcomes)” (Ibid., 482). And when,
as the authors assume, a certain developmental outcome can not be attributed to a
single cause, the concept of ‘equifinality’ receives prominence which holds that
different developmental means and combinations of means can lead to the same
outcome. If it is true that any given developmental outcome is but one of
numerous possible outcomes, then indeed “the search for the conditions and
range of ontogenetic plasticity, including its age-associated changes, is
fundamental to the study of development” (Ibid., 480).
Explicitly, the authors address the question of whether adult intellectual
development follows a structuralist, stage-like logic, they however opt in favour
of a functionalist model. The authors’ focus thereby is clearly on adult
development. Baltes and colleagues however find little evidence in support of
stage theories in general, but grant only some limited, but at least some, value to
the structuralist
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search for higher forms of reasoning, since it is a “search for bodies of factual
and procedural knowledge with a high degree of generality and meaning” which
is able to “counteract the lifespan tendency toward fragmentation and
specialization.”
For this, wisdom is a prototypical example. In a recent article (Baltes,
Glück, & Kunzmann, 2002), Baltes and co-workers reconfirm their proposal to
focus psychological theory and research on wisdom. While it had been a
prominent reason for introducing the concept of wisdom to better account for
“what might be positive in adult development and aging” (Ibid., 329), the more
recent research focus has been broadened to include not only “the study of
positive aspects of human aging,” but to “conceptualize wisdom as an
instantiation of a construct that, for all phases and contexts of life, offers the
potential for defining the means and ends toward a good or even optimal life”
(Ibid.).
Toward a new understanding of development
Successful aging and especially wisdom are valuable constructs of psychological
investigation, and the SOC model of Baltes and Staudinger, accounting for
selection, optimization and compensation may prove to be theoretically and
empirically helpful to understand successful aging (c.f. Freund & Baltes, 1998).
In regard to developmental theory construction, I appreciate this view as very
comprehensive framework. I agree with Richard Lerner (2002) that, because of
its innovative impact, the life-span perspective should be taken into consideration
in the field. However, in concern for development and  learning of children and
adolescents, we need to also have more detailed and focussed expertise which
includes earlier and earliest times and experiences in a person’s life.12 This does
not imply calling into question the comprehensive framework of the life-span
perspective or reducing it to but one of many specializations in the field of
developmental psychology, but it implies going more into the detail without
loosing the whole. My conclusion for our theme
                                                
12 Baltes et. al. (1998: 1029) are aware that their deviation from and neglect of more traditional,
sequential conceptualizations of development are in part due to their focus on old and very old
age.
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here is that the life-span development perspective of Baltes and Staudinger may
be inspiring and helpful for the advancement of structural-developmental theory
building, since it provides strong arguments and opens a perspective for the
greater variety and complexity of human and religious development.
It is remarkable that, in Gil Noam’s texts (which have been important in
my reformulation of religious development so far), we find a view which
resonates with the life-span perspective of Baltes and Staudinger. It is Noam’s
view that cognitive developmentalists have put cart (cognitive competencies)
before the horse (the life history).13 The metaphor of the cart and the horse refers
above all to the neglect of the emotional, psychodynamical dimension. Noam
suggests to identify the psychodynamic tasks which a person has to deal with as
“themata;” then development appears as interplay of themata and schemata. With
this model, Noam suggests to go beyond Piaget and to include a decisive focus
on the psychodynamic domain. It is further remarkable that Noam structures his
schemata as styles of interpersonal relation and thus has incorporated and
highlighted the interpersonal domain in development.
I conclude that the innovative contributions in the field of developmental
psychology, especially the life-span developmental perspective, help us clarify
the contours of a revised model of human and religious development, because:
 it allows to take a step back from mono-causal, unidimensional and
unifunctional explanations which have been an all too heavy burden on the
shoulder of Piagetian theories, e.g. the Piagetian “logic of development” with
its assumption that cognition is the motor of development;
 it suggests to integrate the dimension of function and the psychodynamic and
symbolic-narrative content dimensions;
 it suggests a life-span perspective from the start and thus takes for granted
the integration of adult life and old age;
                                                
13 ”It is my view that cognitively based theorists have overlooked the central structuring
activities of the self by defining the epistemic self as the sole representative of structure. In
the process, I believe, the cart was placed before the horse, life history became content to the
structure of the epistemic self ... Epistemology replaced life history.” (Noam, 1990, p. 378).
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 it re-opens the factor field of human development and religious development
for a fresh approach of scientific exploration, e.g. by suggesting to consider
the dynamics of compensation.
Nevertheless, I see no reason why the life-span model would contradict to (re-)
consider the stage descriptions of existing developmental theories. But they have
to be understood as heuristic tools – which is possible after the removal of
overburdening them with assumptions of causal explanations. However, for
reason of clarification, they could be called ‘styles’, because we assume that the
concept of ‘stage’ is associated with the strict Piagetian logic of development.
This is what I have suggested to do with Fowler’s faith development theory. I
thus put up my own proposal for discussion here.
Faith development revisited: the religious styles perspective
My general intention here is a re-examination of contemporary developmental
psychology as it concerns and is concerned with religious orientation. Fowler’s
(1981) faith development theory will be the focus of my discussion, because his
theory is one of the more recent progressions of developmental psychology into
the domain of religion which has enjoyed world-wide attention,14 and can serve,
in its strengths and deficits, as instance to develop questions and possible
solutions. My concern is with integration and account for complexity and also
there I find features in Fowler’s work to expand on. Because, among the
contemporary models of religious development, I regard James Fowler’s faith
development theory to be the most comprehensive one and to be open for
including innovative perspectives, I have chosen it for elaborating a new
perspective on religious development and for putting it in concrete forms of
theory and research (cf. Streib, 2001a; 2003b).
                                                
14 I have searched and described the considerable body of more than 80 dissertations and
research projects using the faith development instrument elsewhere (Streib, 2003a).
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Let me begin with a somewhat unusual presentation of Fowler’s theory. From the
beginning of my research and reflection on Fowler’s faith development theory, a
model has attracted my attention which I have always looked at with a sense of
regret that Fowler has not expanded this line of thought, but that he allowed it to
reside into the background: The figure, “Toward a Model of the Dynamics of
Adult Faith,” which has been published in an article in 1982 (Fowler, 1982)
includes factors such as biological and cultural time, and socio-economic and
cultural influences from the person’s environment, and, as part of that, influences
from religious institutions. Inside the person, we find notice of the unconscious,
of the “structuring power of the contents of faith,” and, of course, of the
“operational structures of knowing and valuing in faith.” Of course, everyone
who has studied Stages of Faith knows that the operational structures of faith
have become the prominent concern in Fowler’s theory at the expense of the
other factors. If we interpret the spiral model of faith development (Fowler 1981,
275) from this most comprehensive model of adult faith, we realize that, perhaps
most importantly, the factor time has been dissociated from biology and culture
and restricted to the structural-developmental clock. Here a fundamental
predicament comes to our attention which poses one of most puzzling challenges
to developmental psychology: the risk or danger of a reductionist focus on
precisely defined, but narrow dimensions or domains which later obstructs any
attempt to account for the whole. On this background, I appreciate Fowler’s
comprehensive model, because almost every influence on adult faith
development has been included there and the advocate for multidimensionality
and complexity may find a path to a more comprehensive perspective.
I have presented my critique of Fowler’s theory elsewhere in more detail.
Here, I summarize the shortcomings and deficits which faith development theory
has because of its all too intensive liaison with the Piagetian paradigm. The shift
of emphasis to, even the overburdening of, cognitive development is one face of
the coin, the other is the disregard for dimensions which are just as crucial for the
constitution development of religion such as: the psychodynamical-interpersonal
dimension (the psychodynamic of the self-self-relationship); the relational-
interpersonal dimension (the dynamic of the self-other relationship); the
interpretative, hermeneutic dimension (the dynamic of the self-tradition
relationship); and the life-world
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dimension (the dynamic of the self-social world relationship). I turn my critique
into a proposal and suggest to terminate the primacy of the cognitive structures
as motor and guideline of religious development. In Noam’s words, we should
stop placing the cart before the horse. Instead, life history and life world should
move into the focus of the developmental perspective on religion.
It would be a mistake, however, when such harsh critique would drive us
to pour out the baby with the bath water. There is enough indispensable genius in
the cognitive-developmental perspective that makes it worthwhile to re-think and
revise the Piagetian legacy. Thus taking a more considerate approach, I suggest
to set out for a revised model of religious development which nevertheless
implies that the developmental psychology of religion gradually moves out of the
Piagetian niche.
My answer and proposal therefore is a model which I call the religious
styles perspective. A condensed definition reads: Religious styles are distinct
modi of practical-interactive (ritual), psychodynamic (symbolic), and cognitive
(narrative) reconstruction and appropriation of religion which originate in
relation to life-history and life-world and which, in accumulative deposition,
constitute the variations and transformations of religion over a life time,
corresponding to the styles of interpersonal relations. A multi-layeredness of
religious styles which can be designated as internal pluralism corresponds to the
determined more-perspectiveness. The so-called ‘milestone model’, brought into
discussion by Jane Loevinger (1976), is therefore better suited to illustrate
religious style development than stagewise, ascending models. The ‘milestone
model’ draws the respective style as a rising curve which, while descending
again after a culminating point, persists on a lower level, while the subsequent
styles attain their own climaxes. From such developmental perspective, there are
no plausible reasons either why a certain style should not, at least as precursor,
develop earlier than structural-developmental theories normally assume, but
especially that a potential relevance of a certain style continues after its
biographical peak.
Theoretical and empirical accounts of the religious styles perspective have
proven effective in regard to fundamentalism (Streib, 1999; 2001a; 2001c),
deconversion, adolescent’s fascination with magic (Streib, 1996; 1999),
children’s drawings and interreligious
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negotiation in the classroom (Streib, 2001b; 2003e). Thus, theory and research in
religious development are able to get out of the Piagetian niche and contribute its
gift for understanding and investigating the variety and complexity of religious
orientations in the contemporary religious landscape.
Outlook on religious education
Finally, one of the questions concerning the relation of development and
education can be addressed: What are the implications for educational
psychology, if we suggest to account for greater diversity and complexity of
development?
From within Piagetian type developmental theories, a perspective on
education is implied which some articles have explicated: “Development as the
Aim of Education” is the model and the topic of an article by Kohlberg
(Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972). In the research context of Fritz Oser, this model has
found some resonance in Paul Gmünder’s article, “Religious Development as
aim of Religious Education” (Gmünder, 1979). The expectation is that the
intentional creation of assimilation aporia - the best method is thought to be the
educational application of dilemmata - cause the need for accommodation, i.e.
lead to stage transition. Neo-Piagetian scholars seem to have similar
expectations, when e.g. Gil Noam suggests to understand “Development as the
aim of clinical intervention” (Noam, 1992), but stronger is the warning of Robert
Kegan against pushing people toward developmental stage transition when they
are in need of a culture of embeddedness (Kegan, 1982).
From the life-span perspective, but also from a religious styles perspective,
we have no reason to reinforce developmental pressure; the variety and
complexity contradicts any simple and unidimensional effort. But there are, of
course, ideal types of developmental trajectories and progresses which I describe
as development toward a dialogical religious style, and which Baltes and
Staudinger have described as development of wisdom. In this sense, the new
models of human and religious development present educational aims and sketch
a direction of an ideal learning process. But the pedagogical intervention method
has to be more open, since we cannot rely on the cognitive dynamic of
assimilation and accommodation only, but both,
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learning and development, involve function, relation and psychodynamic factors.
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